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Scientific theories risk instant obsolescence as knowledge advances, 
but moral theories, once established, seem immune to the fashions of 
ethics. Thus, modem physics gives an amusing air to Aristotelian dis-
cussions of the "elements" out of which matter is made, but neither 
Hume nor Kant nor Rawls has made The Nichomachean Ethics any 
less relevant today than it was when it was written. 1 Arguments about 
the good life, it seems, or about how one decides what to do, retain 
their vitality through time in much the way that good literature retains 
its value through social and cultural change. This persistence of basic 
ideas in ethics and literature probably has a common explanation: 
both enterprises address aspects of the human condition that change, 
if at all, too glacially to be noticed in the relatively short space of time 
that separates classical from modem views. 
The recent resurgence of interest in natural law in both moral and 
legal theory illustrates this phenomenon of persistence. In legal the-
ory, the return of natural law as a viable challenger to positivism is 
marked, most notably, by the work of Ronald Dworkin.2 In moral 
theory, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings focused popular 
interest, often critically, on natural law as a potential guide to funda-
mental questions of morality or public policy. 
To describe this renewed interest in natural law as a resurgence 
does imply, no doubt, that the ideas associated with the concept are 
too vital to be put permanently to rest; but resurgence also implies that 
natural law, for whatever reason, has been assigned the role of chal-
lenger to the reigning orthodoxy, rather than that of defending champ. 
By and large, this inference about the role assigned to natural law by 
t © 1992 by Philip Soper. 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, M.S. 1965, Washington, St. Louis; 
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1. Compare ARISTOTLE, De Caelo (On the Heavens), in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
398 (Richard McKean ed., 1941) with ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea (Nichomachean Ethics), 
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, at 935. 
2. Dworkin's challenge to positivism begins with the provocative essay The Model of Rules, 
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967), and culminates in the complex book LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
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the general public is, I think, correct. Natural law seems to evoke a 
degree of skepticism in our society that forces any theory that goes by 
the name to confront a higher burden of proof than is placed on other, 
more familiar theories. In this article, I explore some of the reasons 
for this skepticism - reasons that seem to me to represent confusions 
about what the concept entails, rather than legitimate objections to the 
substantive doctrines of natural law. 
I call the confusions I have in mind natural for two reasons. First, 
I suggest that there are good historical or logical explanations for the 
confusions - indeed, in several cases, the natural law proponent has 
invited or perpetuated the confusion and thus helped to jeopardize the 
public reception of his own ideas. Second, I hope that revealing the 
"natural" origin of these common misunderstandings will help us to 
lay them aside and thus give natural law a better chance to make its 
case on its own terms. 
I. CONFUSING THE MORAL THEORY WITH THE LEGAL THEORY 
One persistent source of confusion, which the above remarks inad-
vertently illustrate, is that natural law refers both to a moral theory 
and a legal theory, neither of which bears any obvious logical relation-
ship to the other. Of these two potential referents, natural law consid-
ered as a moral theory enjoys the longer pedigree and has produced 
the larger body of literature, with proponents to be found among clas-
sical Greek and Roman philosophers, medieval theologians, and con-
temporary moral theorists. Most of these works, particularly in 
classical thought, emphasize the analogy between discovering moral 
laws by reasoning about human nature and discovering the natural 
laws of science. This emphasis allows us to extract at least one of the 
characteristics that makes a moral theory a natural law theory: 
namely, the insistence that moral principles are objectively valid and 
discoverable by reason. 
By itself, this insistence on the objectivity of moral judgments, and 
their grounding in an understanding of human nature, would not dis-
tinguish natural law moral theories from more familiar utilitarian or 
Kantian-based theories. 3 Indeed, that similarity is part of the prob-
lem: explaining what makes natural law different from other "objec-
tive" theories of ethics may invite confusing a particular version of 
natural law (for example, a version that claims a special role for theo-
logical insight into human nature) with what is characteristic of natu-
3. For further elaboration, see Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Problem of Definition, 50 
u. CHI. L. REV. 1170, 1173-75 (1983) (reviewing JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATU-
RAL RIGHTS (1980)). 
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ral law in general. What is characteristic of natural law in general, 
apart from the claim of objectivity, is, however, a topic that can itself 
generate considerable philosophical discussion.4 For the purposes of 
this article, I shall not attempt a precise definition of natural law but 
shall only try to show how some misunderstandings about the theory 
may themselves result from various implicit assumptions about what a 
natural law theory must be. For this purpose, the question whether a 
moral theory is labeled natural law or not is of less concern than the 
implications of any moral theory that, broadly speaking, endorses the 
classical idea that moral truths, like scientific truths, are accessible to 
reasoned human experience. 5 
In contrast to the moral theory, natural law as a legal theory may 
seem somewhat easier to characterize, partly because it takes its shape 
from its explicit opposition to legal positivism: the legal positivist 
claims that no necessary connection exists between law and morality; 
the natural law legal theorist denies that a sharp separation of these 
concepts is possible. To be sure, this brief characterization glosses 
over several varieties of both positivism and of natural law. But the 
description is accurate enough on the whole to allow one to inquire 
what connection, if any, might link the moral and the legal theory. 
On the surface, no connection seems apparent. Thus, one might 
agree with the positivist that to determine "what the law is" without 
any essential reference to morality is always theoretically possible; yet 
in so agreeing, one might remain a natural law moral theorist in evalu-
ating and appraising the law. Conversely, one might concede a con-
nection between law and morality yet deny that the morality with 
which law is connected is that endorsed by the natural law moral theo-
rist. Legal theory, in short, seems to address a question about the con-
nection between two concepts, law and morality. Whatever the 
upshot of that conceptual inquiry, the question of which moral theory 
is true seems open to independent argument and determination. 
4. See, e.g., William K. Frankena, On Defining and Defending Natural Law, in LA w AND 
PHILOSOPHY 200, 209 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). The most persistent question raised by attempts 
to distinguish natural law from other, objective theories of ethics is whether natural law implies 
the existence of universal moral truths that make the theory incompatible with theories that 
recognize cultural or social variation in ethical "truth." See, e.g., Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and 
the Ethics of Traditions, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 3, 18 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). A more 
recent question is whether natural law implies a theory of truth that is ontological, rather than 
metaphysical. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 8 (1987) (criticizing the 
turn to "deontological" natural law found, for example, in FINNIS, supra note 3). For a discus-
sion of this latter question, see Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL 
LAW THEORY, supra, at 31. 
5. For another list of the various meanings of natural law which also concludes with a deci-
sion to use the term in a sense that refers to any objective ethical theory, see Michael S. Moore, 
Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 4, at 188, 190-91. 
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Why, then, is the same term used in both legal and moral theory, 
and why is it that those who begin defending a natural law moral the-
ory so often glide, almost without notice, into the defense of a natural 
law legal theory as if one position entailed the other?6 
A. Historical Sources of Confusion 
One possible explanation is historical: Thomas Aquinas' discus-
sion of natural law remains a classic that is, unfortunately, all too 
often misinterpreted. 7 Aquinas, in his theological speculations, was 
propounding a moral theory - a moral theory that included, as a 
part, a consideration of the relationship between natural law (the 
moral law, given by God) and man-made law. Today, we would view 
this question as a question of political theory: to what extent do laws, 
even if unjust, create moral obligations to obey? In time, however, 
Aquinas' discussion of this issue of political theory came to be con-
strued as a conceptual enterprise about how to determine what law is, 
rather than as a moral enterprise about the power of law to create 
moral obligations. In part, this confusion owes to the way that Aqui-
nas, quoting Augustine, put the point: "a law that is not just, seems to 
be no law at all."8 Modern thinkers can easily see in this claim, taken 
out of context, a direct denial of the positivist's attempt to specify tests 
for legal validity without reference to concepts of justice or morality. 
In context, however, it is clear that Aquinas was not concerned about 
identifying law, or determining legal validity; he was simply making a 
claim about the moral force of law: unjust laws "do not bind in con-
science .... " 9 That claim is perfectly consistent with legal positivism; 
indeed, the modern positivist stresses no point with more missionary 
zeal than that the mere identification of a norm as law (through the 
positivist's tests for legal validity) does not resolve the question of 
whether the law should be obeyed or has any moral force. 10 
B. Etymological Sources of Confusion 
Another possible explanation for the tendency to connect the 
moral and legal uses of natural law is etymological: the inherent am bi-
6. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 3. 
7. For a discussion of the problems encountered in interpreting Aquinas, see id. at 29·36. 
8. 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA ques. 96, art. 4 (Fathers of the English Do-
minican Province trans., 1952). 
9. Id. 
10. This point is arguably the centerpiece of Hart's famous debate with Fuller. See H.L.A. 
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594·600, 615·21 
(1958); see also infra notes 14-16, 46, and accompanying text. 
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guity of the word law itself. When classical proponents of the moral 
theory used the term natural law to describe their views, the evident 
analogy to scientific "laws of nature" helped underscore the central 
claim that moral truths were objectively discoverable by reason. Un-
fortunately, once the term law is introduced, the other sort of law -
human law - becomes an equally obvious potential referent that in-
vites analogy, not to the objective truths of science, but to norms cre-
ated by fiat or will alone. Far from discouraging this possible 
confusion, natural law theories suggesting that God's will can itself be 
the source of moral truth actually help perpetuate the confusion. 
Once started down this particular path - finding the source of 
natural law and moral obligation in fiat or will - the natural law 
theorist must hasten to distinguish the fiat of human will from that of 
God's will. This process might lead the natural law theorist to con-
clude that opposition to legal positivism is somehow a logical conse-
quence of a natural law moral theory. Again, such a conclusion 
mistakes what positivism claims: positivism may claim that human 
will is the key to what law is, but how to evaluate such laws (whether 
by reference to God's will or reasoned principles concerning human 
nature) is a separate matter. 
C. Conceptual Confusions 
A final possible explanation for the tendency to slip from natural 
law moral theory into an antipositivist view about the nature of law is 
conceptual. A natural law moral theory is opposed in its central claim 
to theories that hold morality to be entirely conventional. The legal 
positivist, in contrast, insists that law, at least, is nothing but conven-
tion. In opposing conventional theories of morality, one might think 
that the natural law moral theorist has some logical reason also to 
oppose conventional theories of law. Again, to see why this should be 
so is not easy: no apparent contradiction exists in agreeing with the 
positivist that "law" is used conventionally, whereas morality is not. 
Nevertheless, the tendency to take the same, anticonventional stance 
as regards both law and morality raises the general question whether 
any connection exists between one's moral theory (of whatever sort) 
and one's legal theory. If we knew the answer to that general ques-
tion, we could perhaps apply it to assess the possibility of a connection 
in the particular case of natural law. 
D. The General Connection Between Moral and Legal Theory 
Consider first the opposite of the natural law moral theorist: the 
theorist who insists that morality is entirely conventional, or, even 
2398 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:2393 
more strongly, that all moral judgments are either relative or meaning-
less. Here, at least, a logical connection might seem to exist between 
one's moral theory and one's legal theory. If one thinks that moral 
judgments are meaningless, then there is little point in advocating a 
theory of law that insists that one determine what law is, not just by a 
factual inquiry into the conventions that have been accepted, but also 
by reference to minimum standards of morality. If morality has no 
content or meaning, it can hardly serve as a check on the positivist's 
test for legal validity, any more than it could serve as a check on indi-
vidual behavior. 
The problem with this conclusion is that it ignores the fact that the 
meaning of "law" is not a matter for individuals, with varying moral 
theories, to determine for themselves. The above conclusion in one 
sense is perfectly appropriate: the moral nihilist could see no point in a 
theory that urged officials or citizens to determine law by reference, in 
part, to concepts of justice or morality. But the fact that the nihilist 
could see no point in such a theory would not prevent a society, mis-
guided though it would be according to the nihilist, from continuing to 
insist on some connection between morality (as society views it) and 
the conventions oflaw. In short, even the nihilist might have to recog-
nize that the conventional understanding about the meaning of law 
incorporates a theory of morality or justice into the test for legal valid-
ity - a theory that the nihilist thinks is pointless but that society, 
presumably, does not. In this case, as long as he could describe and 
apply society's moral theory, the nihilist could become a natural law 
legal theorist while remaining a moral nihilist. 
One might object that the nihilist in this case (for convenience, I 
shall call my imagined moral nihilist Judge Ke/sen) is not really a nat-
ural law legal theorist. Judge Kelsen may be able to invoke conven-
tional understandings about morality in evaluating legal conventions, 
but he only sees those moral claims as themselves conventional. A 
true natural law legal theorist, it might be argued, refuses to recognize 
unjust law as "legal" because such laws really are unjust, not because 
they are only conventionally recognized as unjust. Judge Kelsen, it 
turns out, is actually only a sophisticated positivist, applying exactly 
the same postivist's legal test of pedigree or source to establish the 
"moral" standards that determine legal validity. In both straightfor-
ward positivism and Judge Kelsen's "natural law," "what law is" 
turns out simply to be a matter of what is conventionally accepted. 
1. The Hidden Agenda of Natural Law 
This objection is instructive, I think, because it reveals what might 
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be called the hidden agenda of the natural law moral theorist when it 
comes to doing legal theory, and it may thus help explain the tendency 
to find the two theories connected in the literature. The natural law 
moral theorist wants to use legal theory to reinforce the claims about 
objectivity and truth that characterize his moral theory. One way to 
do this is to urge that convention alone does not determine one's legal 
obligations, that one must also have some regard for the morality of 
the alleged obligation.11 As the above objection illustrates, there 
would be little point in urging such a view unless one had in mind by 
morality something more than convention; thus the battle for the natu-
ral law position within legal theory is, indirectly, a battle to proselytize 
the objective, nonconventional view of morality that characterizes the 
natural law moral theory. The positivist may well urge that one sepa-
rate these questions of moral and legal theory and may well protest 
that, when it comes to morality, he (the positivist) is every bit as per-
suaded of objective truth and ready to urge that unjust laws be ignored 
or disobeyed as the next person. But that is just the problem: the 
positivist leaves this question of the validity and objectivity of moral 
judgments (and thus the morality of law) to be settled in another 
arena, whereas the natural law theorist does not want to permit that 
luxury. By opposing legal positivism and claiming that only human 
directives that are not too unjust are law, the natural law legal theorist 
forces confrontation, not only with the question of what we mean by 
law, but also with the question of what we mean by morality or justice. 
This explanation of the connection between the moral and legal 
theories, however, still seems at best to be psychological or strategic, 
rather than logical. Several points seem undeniable with respect to the 
claimed connection between the two kinds of theory: 
(1) First, it still remains true that a natural law moral theorist who 
does not share the "hidden agenda" described above could accept the 
11. This claim about the moral or legal relevance of convention should be distinguished from 
the different question how to decide what the convention is in the first place - a thorny problem 
that seems to provide a natural spawning ground for "natural law" theories of adjudication. See, 
e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 867 (1972) ("[T]he 
social rule theory ... believes that the social practice constitutes a rule which the normative 
judgment accepts; in fact the social practice helps tojustify a rule which the normative judgment 
states."). As discussed infra section 111.C.l, this tum to adjudication within natural law legal 
theory misses the point: as long as the judge's decision has the force of "law" even though wrong 
(i.e., even if the judge applies the wrong theory of adjudication or misapplies the correct theory), 
whether the standards to which he is supposed to be referring are those identified by the positivist 
or the natural lawyer matters little. What counts in the end is the judge's fiat (determined, 
presumably, in good faith). In the present context, this attempt to find a connection (in the 
common rejection of convention alone as a clue to truth without consulting "reason") between 
the moral and legal senses of natural law is misguided: the question is not how to determine what 
the social norm is but what to do with that social norm once it is determined (in whatever 
fashion) if the norm proves sufficiently unjust. 
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positivist view that law is conventional and still maintain that morality 
is objective, without contradiction. 
(2) Second, any person holding any moral theory (not just a natu-
ral law moral theory) could have a similar "agenda," leading her to 
oppose legal positivism in order to advocate her own particular brand 
of morality as part of the test for law. This fact underscores the point 
that what we mean by law is, at least in part, a conceptual question 
and ought to be approached as such without hidden agendas; if the 
conceptual inquiry shows that law and morality are connected, then 
we will indeed have to confront the content of both in deciding "what 
law is" and "what one ought to do." 
(3) Finally, one who accepts a purely conventional view of moral-
ity need not be only a sophisticated positivist when it comes to legal 
theory. Positivism may stress that law is conventional, but most theo-
ries of positivism do more than that; they also describe exactly how to 
distinguish the conventions of law from other conventions of society. 
A postivist theory of law will usually designate, for example, some 
official set of rules or standards as the "legal" conventions, to be dis-
tinguished not only from morality but also from other social conven-
tions.12 Thus, our imagined Judge Kelsen could conclude that certain 
basic legal standards (identified as "legal" by the positivist's basic test 
for legal validity) clashed with other, moral conventions of society. In 
that case, Kelsen could act as an antipositivist, refusing to uphold the 
"immoral" legal standards but maintaining that the "morality" by 
which such standards were gauged was itself only conventional. 
Although Kelsen would be determining "what law is," in the end, by 
reference to what is conventionally accepted, that fact by itself need 
not make Kelsen a positivist. To be a natural law legal theorist seems 
only to require that one determine legal validity by reference, not only 
to the positivist test of pedigree, but also by reference to morality -
including conventional morality if that turns out to be the true theory 
of morality. 13 
12. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961) (offering a model that 
presumably could be used to distinguish a wide variety of conventional social rules: moral rules, 
legal rules, rules of games, etiquette, aesthetics, and so forth). 
13. Of course, it is possible that a particular positivist theory of law might include conven-
tional morality as part of the test for legal validity in a way that eliminates the above distinction 
between legal and moral conventions. (It is sometimes suggested that Dworkin's theory oflaw is, 
in the end, just such a version of positivism in which the positivist's social-fact test for law has 
been broadened to include conventional or positive morality as well as the more traditional legal 
conventions). See Rolf Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151, 156 
(1971); Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 
M1cH. L. REV. 473, 509-16 (1977). In this respect, a conventional moral theory might be 
thought compatible with positivism in a way that other moral theories are not. This conclusion, 
however, would not be accepted by all positivists. Hart, for example, seems willing to say that if 
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2. A Possible Point of Contact 
Thus far, then, we have no reason to modify our initial suggestion 
that no logical connection links natural law as a moral theory to natu-
ral law as a legal theory. Still, it seems slightly unsatisfactory to sug-
gest that the only explanation for the continued linkage of the two 
theories in the literature is the hidden agenda of using the legal theory 
to help advance the moral theory. There may be another explanation 
for the linkage that, unlike the suggestions made thus far, goes directly 
to the heart of the disagreement within legal theory itself. 
The explanation I have in mind turns the hidden agenda into the 
central issue in legal theory. Any inquiry into the meaning of a con-
cept must begin with some preanalytic notion of the phenomenon 
under investigation. Law is no exception. Inquiries into what we 
mean by law always assume some rough, preanalytic notion of law 
that further, more accurate analysis will clarify. In the case of the 
positivist, the preanalytic phenomenon has always been, roughly, the 
common sense idea· that law is a set of official directives designed to 
guide conduct. Further analysis and disputes center, for example, on 
whether these directives are simply the coercive orders of de facto sov-
ereigns, or the rules accepted voluntarily by a group of officials, or 
directives with putative normative force that is in some ways like, and 
in other ways unlike, the claimed normative force of ordinary moral 
rules. Positivism, in short, assumes from the beginning that a theory 
of law is supposed to provide a model for directives whose primary 
point is to guide conduct. 
Only recently, I think, has it become clear that one way to explain 
the difference between the positivist and the natural law legal theorist 
is that the latter implicitly assumes a different preanalytic phenome-
non from the outset. The natural law legal theorist believes that we 
are attempting to model directives that aim not simply to guide con-
duct but to guide conduct in a certain way: legal directives purport to 
create moral obligations of "fidelity" to the law. It is impossible to 
read the famous debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart without 
feeling that this difference in starting point separates the two in a way 
that ensures that each will miss the other's point. Fuller assumes that 
the point of a model of law is to show what law must be to justify the 
moral standards are made part of a legal standard, as in the case of the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution, then those moral standards are part of the law and consistent with positivism 
whether or not the reference is to conventional or "true" morality. See HART, supra note 12, at 
199·200. But see JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 45-52 (1979) (arguing that moral 
standards, even if explicitly incorporated in legal standards, cannot themselves be part of the 
positivist law). See generally PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 101-09 (1984). 
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claims to "fidelity" that law makes - that is why the title of his piece 
focuses on "fidelity to law."14 Hart, in contrast, is eloquent in his in-
sistence that people mistakenly think that positivism leads to a moral 
endorsement of hideous legal directives, including even the horrors of 
the Nazi legal system. For Hart, nothing could be further from the 
truth; positivism encourages people to exercise their critical moral fac-
ulties by separating the question of what law is from the question of its 
moral relevance as a guide to conduct. 15 Fuller and Hart thus start 
from completely opposite assumptions, one thinking that a model of 
law must preserve the claim to moral fidelity, the other thinking that 
law must be washed clean, in Holmes' cynical acid as it were, of any 
necessary moral content at all. If one starts with such different as-
sumptions about the goal of a model of law, it is easy to see how fur-
ther disputes about the details of the competing models might become 
pointless: the disagreement lies in the starting points, riot in the details 
along the way.16 
If Fuller was right that an adequate model of law must show how 
the law's claims to fidelity can be justified, then the hidden agenda of 
the natural law moral theorist becomes the central problem of the con-
ceptual inquiry into the nature of law. The natural law legal theorist 
will not be urging that morality must function as a check on legal 
validity simply in order to advance his own moral theory; rather, the 
claim that legal norms must have moral effect will be the central claim 
of the law itself, and the conceptual inquiry will necessarily reflect that 
claim. The natural law legal theorist's insistence on testing legal con-
ventions by objective moral standards will be one attempt to explain 
the preanalytic phenomenon. In this way, the natural lawyer escapes 
the charge that his moral theory determines his position in legal the-
ory. In fact, under this view, the opposite turns out to be true: the 
legal theory leads to the moral theory as the most plausible way of 
defending the law's claims.17 
Does the above argument show, then, that a connection exists be-
tween the legal and moral theory? I think not. First, of course, one 
might contest the question of what the correct preanalytic phenome-
non is. Whether legal systems make an essential claim to moral fidel-
14. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
15. See HART, supra note 12, at 206; NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 160 (1981). 
16. Years later Fuller finally acknowledged, in some apparent astonishment, that he and his 
opponents had been operating with different underlying assumptions all along. See LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 200-07 (rev. ed. 1969). 
17. For a recent example of this approach, see Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, 
in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 4. 
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ity, and, if so, what kind of fidelity is claimed, are difficult questions to 
settle and should, perhaps, be resolved at the end of the inquiry rather 
than taken for granted at the start. But even if one accepts the view 
that law makes essential moral claims that a theory of law must re-
flect, one is not yet committed to a natural law moral theory as the 
only way of modeling those claims. One might also, for example, in-
sist that the claims are unjustified and attempt to show through a com-
bination of legal and political theory that legal systems can and should 
modify or eliminate any strong claim to moral fidelity. Finally, even if 
one is inclined to accept the moral claims of the law as a central fea-
ture that must be accounted for in a legal theory, the law's claim to 
fidelity does not by itself entail an objective ethics; other moral theo-
ries besides natural law may provide the basis for such a claim. 
What we have shown at best, it seems, is a possible connection 
between legal theory and the claim by legal systems that the actions of 
the system are morally justified. This may explain why some modem 
natural law theorists believe they have discovered an ally in the pos-
ture of the legal system - an ally in the form of a widespread and 
important practice that seems to assume an objective truth for the ob-
ligations imposed on citizens similar to the central thesis of objective 
duties found in a natural law moral theory. If this is indeed the pos-
ture of the legal system (and this may require demonstration and argu-
ment), then one can still note, without belittling the importance of this 
alliance between the claims of natural law moral theory and those of 
the legal system, that both claims must be tested and demonstrated. 
In that sense, the connection between the legal and the moral theory 
remains, at best, not one of logical entailment but of sympathetic part-
nership in the attempt to defend claims about the objectivity of moral 
(and legal) judgments. 
II. CONFUSIONS WITHIN THE MORAL THEORY: THE 
UNFORTUNATE CONNOTATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 
One journalist described the reaction to the revelation that a poten-
tial Justice of the Supreme Court might actually believe in natural law 
"as though the man had let slip a reference to torture by thumbscrews 
... [or] had disclosed an obscure and probably sinister belief in al-
chemy."18 Another suggested it was as if critics "had found [Judge 
Thomas] at the airport in a Hare Krishna robe."19 Nor were only 
18. Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at 9. 
19. Stephen Chapman, Is Thomas' Belief in Natural Law Unnaturally Odd?. CHI. TRIB., July 
18, 1991, § l, at 27. 
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Thomas' opponents concerned about the possible damage to his repu-
tation - not to mention confirmation prospects - if he were branded 
a believer in natural law. Senator Danforth, Thomas' principal sup-
porter in the hearings, went out of his way to put to rest the idea that 
the nominee "believed scary things about natural law,"20 and Judge 
Thomas himself, on the opening day of the hearings, agreed with the 
characterization of his previous writings on the subject as just the 
"philosophical musings" of a "part-time" political theorist.2 • The 
main point, repeatedly emphasized by the nominee, was that he did 
not now believe, and never had, that there was any role for natural law 
to play in constitutional adjudication. 
These reactions reveal two possible concerns about natural law. 
The first concern is about the moral theory itself and the manner in 
which one determines moral truths by reasoning about human nature. 
The second concern is peculiar to the judicial institution and points 
out that, whatever one thinks about the moral theory, something 
about a natural law view is inconsistent with the role of judges within 
legal systems in general, or at least within a constitutional democracy 
such as our own. This latter apprehension reveals, I think, the most 
interesting set of confusions about what the term natural law entails, 
and I shall consider this problem in some depth in the next section. 
Before doing so, however, it is worth briefly acknowledging some of 
the unhappy connotations that the moral theory itself often has. 
A. The Religious Connection 
If the central idea of a natural law moral theory were simply the 
claim that moral truths are objectively valid and knowable by reason, 
there would be no more reason to react skeptically to the theory than 
to any other "objective" theory of morality.22 Indeed, as some com-
mentators during the Thomas hearings rushed to point out, natural 
law could easily be used to describe the moral theories that many in 
20. See David G. Savage, Thomas Backs Off Abortion, Natural Law Statements, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 1991, at Al (quoting Sen. John C. Danforth (R.-Mo.)). 
21. See The Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, Federal News Service, 
Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. 
22. There is some disagreement about whether a utilitarian theory could be an example of a 
natural law theory. This disagreement stems in part from the view that natural law posits the 
existence of moral principles that are absolute and universal in a way that is inconsistent with the 
utilitarians' suggestion that any moral principle, however apparently inviolable, may in theory 
have to yield to the greater social good. See Soper, supra note 3, at 1175 n.21; see also supra note 
4. Resolving this question is unnecessary for purposes of this article, particularly since the issue 
is not what will count as a natural law moral theory, but, rather, how such a theory differs from 
other, widely accepted theories that assume an objective morality. 
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our society would accept without skepticism.23 The putative concern 
over the theory in Judge Thomas's case, it was suggested, simply 
masked the real concern about Judge Thomas' actual values - partic-
ularly with respect to abortion.24 
This defense of natural law as a moral theory identified by the in-
sistence on the objectivity of moral judgments certainly puts the the-
ory back into the mainstream of ethical thought (at least within 
society, if not among philosophers). It also leaves natural law with the 
same problems that have always confronted any moral theory that 
claims truth for its judgments: how to substantiate those claims and 
account for value disagreement. If we accept that natural law is just 
another way of claiming that ethical statements can be true or false, 
then we will have to recognize that people who accept the theory can 
nevertheless reach different conclusions about fundamental moral 
questions with no clear way of judging among them. Indeed, the com-
mentators during the Thomas hearings who rushed to defend this view 
of natural law were quick to point out that the theory did not dictate 
any particular position on the morality of abortion, particular sexual 
practices, or other aspects of human nature that have often historically 
been associated with a natural law theory.25 
The reference to unfortunate historical connotations points to one 
reason for the skepticism about natural law. As previously noted, the 
theory has often failed to distinguish between faith and reason as the 
basis for one's claim about moral truth. As long as the doctrine is 
associated with a particular version of natural law - for example, one 
that finds the source of moral truth in revelation, or, even more nar-
rowly, revelation through a particular church - it will be easy to un-
derstand why those who do not share the faith greet the theory with 
distrust. 26 
23. For one of the best clarifications of the issue in the press during the Thomas hearings, see 
the Steinfels article which appeared in the New York Times: 
[R]aising questions about a specific version of natural law or its relevance to judicial review 
is different than raising eyebrows at the very idea. For all its variations, the broad notion of 
natural law is straightforward: Objective standards of right and wrong that human reason 
can discern as inherent to the nature of humans and the world about them. 
Steinfels, supra note 18 (citing as examples of illustrative proponents: Locke, Montesquieu, Jef-
ferson, Adams, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King (among others)). 
24. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Perspectives on the Supreme Court; Unnatural Brawl over Natu-
ral Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at BS. 
2S. See id. 
26. I do not mean to deny that one can have reason to wonder whether natural law, in any 
particular case, is being used in a religious or secular sense. Indeed, it is because the historical 
connotation still flourishes that doubts were raised in Judge Thomas' case. Compare Patrick 
Riley, Thomas' Nod to Natural Law Is No Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at BS (director of 
governmental affairs of the Catholic League, urging a religious interpretation of natural law, in 
opposition to secular, humanist, and positivist interpretations) with Danny Goldberg, Perspec-
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B. The Secular Substitute for Revelation: Self-Righteousness and 
Self-Evidence 
Modern versions of a natural law moral theory that stake claims to 
moral truth on reason, rather than on faith, should not confront any 
greater degree of skepticism than any other objective ethical theory. 
In practice, however, one often finds that natural law theorists meet 
the great problem of an objective ethics - the problem of proof, or 
how one knows what is true - in a way that seems, to some, to be the 
secular equivalent of the claim to special insight through personal rev-
elation. Thus, if the test for truth in a natural law theory is that a 
proposition is "self-evident," those who disagree seemingly must ad-
mit to being either immoral or stupid.27 The resulting perception of 
self-righteousness may explain why a hostile reaction to the term natu-
ral law arises even when the proponent intends no particular theologi-
cal connection. 
Again, it should be clear that this aversion to natural law is not a 
justified reaction to the theory itself but is, at best, a plausible response 
to particular versions of the theory or to the zeal with which particular 
advocates of natural law press their views. In this respect, natural law 
is no different from other objective theories. Explaining how one 
knows the truth will be a problem for any such theory, and even "self-
evidence" as the ultimate test for truth has a long, if contentious, his-
tory in moral philosophy. If natural law theorists have difficulty loos-
ening themselves psychologically from the historical connection with 
the sense of "God given truths,"28 that may explain their tendency to 
be overconfident about their views; it does not explain why the theory 
itself should be suspect. 
III. CONFUSIONS WITHIN THE LEGAL THEORY: THE DILEMMA 
OF NATURAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
From the point of view of legal theory, where positivism and natu-
tives on the Supreme Court; It's Religion in Sheep's Clothing, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at BS 
(According to the chair of the ACLU Foundation of Southern California: "The idea of a 'natu-
ral Jaw' that superseded human Jaw is not a judicial concept but is fundamentally a theological 
concept. It directly contradicts many of the deepest concerns about religious intolerance that led 
to ... the Bill of Rights .... "). 
27. For further discussion, see Soper, supra note 3, at 1178-79. 
28. See, e.g., Linda P. Campbell, Thomas' Belief in 'Higher Law' at Center Stage, CHI. TRIB., 
Aug. 18, 1991, § 4, at 1 ("One of the great dangers ofa natural-Jaw philosophy is that individu-
als hold their views with great certainty and rigidity because they are thought to be God given 
truths." (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, CLARENCE 
THOMAS' NATURAL LAW PHILOSOPHY 8 (1991))). 
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ral law have long had rather specialized meanings, the reactions re-
vealed during the Thomas hearings point to one of the more intriguing 
and least-explored dilemmas that confront any natural law legal theo-
rist. I shall call this the natural law dilemma, though I shall postpone 
its description and investigation for the moment to focus first on cer-
tain other misconceptions about the role of natural law within the ju-
diciary itself. 
In order to avoid further confusion with the various senses in 
which natural law is used within moral theory, I shall simply use mo-
rality to talk about the issue that assumed central importance in the 
Thomas hearings: to what extent should a judge's view of morality 
(whatever kind it is, natural law or otherwise) affect his decision in a 
legal case? 
One point on which Judge Thomas and Senator Biden seemed to 
agree was that no judge should ever retreat to natural law to reach a 
result inconsistent with the result required by the Constitution or by 
positive law. It was this possible connotation of natural law that 
Biden, among others, wanted to be sure Judge Thomas did not em-
brace. 29 Moreover, it was this possible connotation - that natural 
law meant a "higher law" than the Constitution, on which a judge was 
free to draw in opposition to the clear mandates of the Constitution 
and laws, that the media often took to be the critical definition of belief 
in natural law.30 
1. Confusing the Natural Law Debate with the 
lnterpretivism Debate 
Note that Biden (and Thomas too, for that matter) seemed to con-
cede that some provisions of the Constitution, of course, could only be 
interpreted by reference to fundamental, objective moral truths.31 In 
this respect, Biden, at least, was siding with those who oppose the idea 
29. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Law and Natural Law: Questions for Judge Thomas, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 1991, at Cl ("If Clarence Thomas believes that the Supreme Court should apply 
natural law above the Constitution, then in my view he should not serve on the Court."). 
30. See, e.g., Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants Juries to Follow Natural Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at B16 ("Natural law, the theory that written law is invalid if it is contrary 
to universal moral principles, has been much in the news lately, given Judge Clarence Thomas's 
remarks on the topic."). 
31. Biden, supra note 29 ("[T]he American tradition of natural law has been to protect the 
rights of individuals to make decisions about matters of moral significance .... "). In the end, 
Thomas' position about whether natural law could be used to interpret the vague clauses of the 
Constitution remained unclear. Despite rejecting a "higher law" approach to constitutional ad-
judication, he suggested that the "liberty component of the Due Process Clause" reflected the 
Framers' natural law ideas and would require an interpretation in accordance with "our history 
and our tradition." The Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, Federal News 
Service, Sept. 12, 1991, at 16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. 
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of strict construction, either because it is not really possible to discern 
original intent, or because the Constitution reveals an intent to permit 
judicial enforcement of unenumerated fundamental values. What we 
have here, of course, is an old, if recently revived, debate about judicial 
review and how to interpret the Constitution, made new only because 
of the suggestion that somehow we are talking about "natural law," 
rather than about "strict construction" or "interpretivism." 
That this debate is not peculiar to natural law was made clear in 
the exchange that took place on the op-ed page of the New York Times 
between Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael McConnell. Tribe, in 
a letter raising critical questions about Judge Thomas, suggested that 
recourse to natural law had last occurred over eighty years ago during 
the now discredited Lochner era of judicial activism. 32 McConnell, in 
response, chided Tribe for inconsistency: "Judge Thomas's opponents 
cannot have it both ways. They cannot attack Judge Bork for his re-
fusal to recognize rights based in natural law and then attack Judge 
Thomas for supporting those rights."33 Tribe retreated (or clarified): 
"As Mr. McConnell knows, my objection is not necessarily to 'natural 
law' thinking, which I agree has a venerable history and much to com-
mend it. My concern is with how Judge Thomas deploys natural-law 
approaches."34 Once again, how the theory is applied, rather than the 
theory itself, is the concern. 
The question, then, whether or not the Constitution permits or au-
thorizes judges to look for values beyond those enumerated is a ques-
tion independent of whether one is a natural law legal theorist or a 
positivist. Indeed, the strongest argument for interpreting the Consti-
tution by reference to fundamental moral values is itself a positivist's 
argument: namely, that the text itself, in such vague standards as the 
Due Process Clause, or the Ninth Amendment, inevitably requires re-
course to moral principles in order to determine the law.35 
2. Natural Law as ''Higher Law" 
What about Biden's concern that natural law would conflict with 
clear directives of positive law? Once we get beyond the debate about 
original intent and interpretivism, should we worry that a judge who 
32. Laurence H. Tribe, Clarence Thomas and "Natural Law," N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1991, at 
Al5. 
33. Michael W. McConnell, Trashing Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at A23. 
34. Laurence H. Tribe, Letter to the Editor, The Case Judge Thomas Shouldn't Have Heard, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at A22. 
35. See, e.g., HART, supra note 12, at 199-200 (noting that the U.S. Constitution, by this 
incorporation of moral principles, makes morality relevant to determining the law in a manner 
fully consistent with positivism). 
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believes in natural law might substitute his own moral views even 
where the text is clear - not because he is interpreting or applying the 
Constitution, but in direct disregard of the Constitution? 
We should first note that we have now moved into a world in 
which the terms natural law and positivism are being used with very 
different meanings than those they normally carry within legal theory. 
If anything, the positivist should concern someone like Senator Biden, 
because the positivist insists that deciding what law is has no necessary 
bearing on the moral question of what one ought to do about it. 
Whether the citizen ought to obey the law or, for that matter, whether 
the judge ought (as a moral matter) to follow or apply the law, rather 
than try to subvert it if he can, is a separate question for the positivist, 
who urges judge and citizen alike to consider this issue seriously after 
having decided what "the law is."36 Positivism, as used by Biden and, 
indeed, much of the media - meant something else altogether: it 
tended to be used as a synonym for the originalist side of the interpreti-
vism debate, with those who believe only in written or textual author-
ity being labeled positivists. Or it tended to be equated with a moral 
theory that made human law obligatory, regardless of its moral worth 
- exactly the claim that positivists vigorously contest as a misunder-
standing of their theory. 
But we can overlook the difference in terminology and still ask the 
central question that so concerned Biden: What is the obligation of a 
judge, once the law is found? Can the judge, if she thinks the law 
sufficiently immoral, substitute her views for the legal mandate? This 
question is one that both positivists and natural law theorists alike 
must confront - not as a question within legal theory, but as a ques-
tion of political or moral theory. It may well be that if one considers 
the issue as a problem in political theory, one will conclude that judges 
have a moral responsibility to "apply the law." But that conclusion 
will not be based on the fact that the law so requires - an obvious 
circularity. The conclusion will have to be based on some general 
moral or political theory about the obligations inherent in the role of a 
judge, balanced against the evil a judge believes she will help promote 
if she carries out her role. 37 Or one may decide that the oath of office 
36. See Hart, supra note 10, at 618; see also supra notes 10, 14-16, infra note 46, and accom-
panying text. 
37. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 404-07 ("inclusive integrity" theory 
"define[s a judge's] powers against those of other institutions and officers"); Robert P. George, 
Judges and Natural Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1991, at Al7 (noting that natural law theory 
may itself require judges to "recognize the limits of their own authority out of respect for the rule 
of law"); see also David 0. Brink, Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered, 68 THE MON-
IST 364, 376-84 (1985) (arguing that judges could not have a moral obligation to apply law that is 
too unjust). 
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(the only theory suggested by Biden) yields the obligation to apply the 
law, right or wrong, though the theory about promissory obligation on 
which this conclusion is based will strike many people as 
unconvincing. 38 
This is not the place to tackle the problems in political theory that 
these issues raise. It is enough to note that the issues are independent 
of the natural law/positivism debate within legal theory. But even if 
we do not actually undertake to answer the question of the limits of a 
judge's duty when faced with unjust law, we can at least use this prob-
lem to illustrate what I began by calling the natural law dilemma. 
B. The Natural Law Dilemma 
To paraphrase a famous question, what does a natural law theorist 
want? What, for example, would it mean for a legal system self-con-
sciously to accept a natural law legal theory? How would that accept-
ance affect how judges· decide cases or how the legal system operates? 
As the above discussion suggests, the natural law legal theorist's 
central idea seems to be that a judge will juxtapose his or her assess-
ment of objective morality or justice against the result apparently re-
quired by the social facts constituted by the authoritative positivist 
legal materials (constitutions, statutes, legal precedents). Because the 
positivist might also urge, as a matter of political theory, that judges 
ignore or subvert very immoral texts, the only practical difference be-
tween positivist and natural law systems is this: what the positivist 
contemplates as a possibility within political theory, the natural law 
theorist wants to describe as a possibility permitted (or required) by 
law itself. For the natural law theorist, the judge will not be facing 
conflicting duties, one imposed by the duty to find and apply the law, 
the other imposed by the moral duty to avoid evil results. Rather, the 
judge will be reaching "moral" results within the role of the judge 
precisely because the positivist's texts are not all there is to "law." 
This difference between the natural law and positivist positions 
often seems merely verbal. Judges will be urged to act the same way in 
both systems, with only the question whether the judge has departed 
from his or her "legal" role distinguishing the two. Of course, ac-
cepting the natural lawyer's way of posing the issue could have consid-
erable practical consequences: judges who ignore "immoral" legal 
38. A promise to enforce law cannot be interpreted to be open·ended, so that any law, how-
ever unjust, is within the scope of the promise. See, e.g., David Lyons, Justification and Judicial 
Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 192 (1984); see also Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts 
Obey the Law?, 77 GEO. L.J. 113 (1988) (discussing complications in the judicial duty to enforce 
the law). 
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texts could not be criticized for violating their legal duty and thus 
would run less risk of losing their jobs or their prestige. Even if such 
judges were reversed or replaced, they would still, according to soci-
ety's own definition of their role, be "doing their job." They might be 
doing their job poorly, but they would still be doing their job. 
If this is what is at stake in the arguments between positivists and 
natural lawyers - namely whether judges will be permitted, as part of 
their job description, to consider the morality of legal directives - the 
difference between the two theories is likely to disappear in any soci-
ety, like ours, in which the basic legal texts already incorporate moral 
standards as guides for evaluating other legal standards. If the Due 
Process Clause, or the Ninth Amendment, or the various penumbra of 
the Bill of Rights (or some combination of the three) is interpreted to 
invite judges to declare and enforce fundamental if unenumerated val-
ues, then any judge can resort to his or her assessment of fundamental 
values without being guilty of straying from his or her duty as judge. 
That is why arguments such as Biden's have an air of self-contradic-
tion: Biden, like many others, rejects the view of strict construction-
ists and accepts a view of the Constitution that is open to fundamental 
moral argument; at the same time, however, he insists that judges have 
a duty to follow the law and not set it aside where it conflicts with 
their own views about morality. In context, this seems to be a differ-
ence without a distinction. 39 
Here, then, is one possible candidate for the difference that it might 
make to be a natural law legal theorist as opposed to a positivist: the 
natural law theorist might suggest that what is merely a contingent 
question for the positivist (does a particular legal system include a gen-
eral fundamental morality clause to control the interpretation and en-
forcement of other legal texts?) becomes, for the natural law 
proponent, a conceptual and necessary matter. Every legal system, in 
order to justify the moral claims that it makes for law, must poten-
tially invite judges to test legal conventions by true morality. 
Although the difference between natural law and positivism will be 
39. Biden's position would be less confused if he really meant that judges interpreting the 
vague moral clauses of the Constitution should still be confined to implementing the positive 
morality of our society, rather than substituting their own moral views for those of the commu-
nity. This would make Biden like the sophisticated positivist who takes the test for law to in-
clude, in appropriate cases, conventional morality as well as other legal conventions, but not 
ultimate or critical morality. See supra note 13. But see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 
HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1105-06 (1975) (explaining how even a nonpositivist (natural law?) judge 
might also be forced to reach decisions inconsistent with the judge's own moral views). In any 
event, it is unlikely that most people who reject strict constructionism intend by that rejection 
simply to replace one sort of convention (the Framers' declared intent) with another (positive 
morality); most probably they mean that judges should look to critical (true) morality to imple-
ment these provisions. 
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undetectable in a system that happens (contingently) to have a funda-
mental morality clause in its basic Constitution, the difference will be 
detectable in general legal theory and will have implications for legal 
systems that lack such a clause. In these latter systems, natural law 
legal theory will, in essence, read into every basic constitution the 
same fundamental morality clause that is explicitly adopted by some, 
ignoring any explicit directive to the contrary. 
I doubt that many natural law theorists would be happy to con-
clude that the above explanation is the complete account of the differ-
ence it would make to be in a natural law society as opposed to a 
positivist one. For one thing, the question whether moral assessment 
of law enters by way of political theory, rather than by way of the 
judge's job description, seems too subtle a distinction to justify the 
amount of energy that has been and is still devoted to the debate be-
tween. positivism and natural law. Something larger seems to be at 
stake, and, indeed, most of the recent writing in natural law legal the-
ory proceeds as if something larger were at stake. But that assumption 
is, I think, unwarranted until one confronts and resolves the following 
natural law dilemma. Natural law opposes the suggestion that "mere" 
convention, or human fiat, has the last word in determining the 
"legal" obligations within a society. These conventions are, according 
to the natural lawyer, to be tested by reference to "true morality" and 
enforced only if they do not depart too far from what such moral stan-
dards require. The dilemma is that only human institutions can do the 
testing. A legal system might adopt natural law legal theory, and self-
consciously encourage officials and citizens to test legal validity by ref-
erence to true morality. Yet in governing its citizens, the state and its 
representatives still must act on their own best assessment of what true 
morality requires. Thus, in the end, any decision about what morality 
requires will be made by fallible human institutions and, if enforceable 
as law, will be enforced just because someone says so, not necessarily 
because the decision is right. Fiat, it seems, must either always control 
- or it can never control (the law can never be said to impose obliga-
tions just because some person, including a judge, has decided it is 
morally appropriate). In the former case, natural law's protest against 
fiat is irrelevant; in the latter case, legal obligations collapse entirely 
into moral obligations. 
This dilemma is, in some respects, familiar. It represents a charge 
that natural law legal theorists have always confronted; namely, that 
their theory has a built-in bias toward anarchy that is just as unfortu-
nate as the positivist's built-in bias toward authoritarianism. Because 
this charge against natural law seems simply to reverse the charge 
August 1992] Natural Confusions 2413 
against the positivist, we may benefit from reviewing the positivist's 
response to the charge of undue authoritarianism. 
The modern positivist, we have noted, denies that his theory has 
any bias that lends moral support to legal convention just because it is 
the convention. Indeed, the positivist responds, the whole point of his 
theory is to separate the question of what law is from the question of 
its moral worth or its practical implications. Elsewhere I have sug-
gested that this response of the positivist reveals a paradox. Oddly, 
positivism's goal of providing an accurate account of the normative 
claims of law leads positivism to depict legal systems as essentially 
claiming what positivism denies; namely, that a necessary connection 
exists between law and morality. 40 
The dilemma for natural law legal theory arises in exactly the op-
posite fashion from this paradox of positivism. The positivist's self-
imposed stricture on engaging in substantive moral theory means that 
he cannot account for (justify) the normative claims of law that he 
observes but can only point to and describe those claims. The conse-
quence is that the positivist's own distinctive thesis (the denial of a 
connection between law and morality) must itself remain in doubt un-
til one actually tests it through political theory. Natural law, in con-
trast, has no trouble with the normative claim of law because it starts 
by assuming a true connection (not just a claimed one) between law 
and morality - exactly the claim that law seems to make. The di-
lemma of natural law is that, though it insists that the "higher law" of 
morality be used to test the claims of human institutions to determine 
obligations through law, the theory does not offer any advice about 
how to implement this "higher law" test in an actual legal system. 
Thus, even if one embraced the natural law idea, one could not escape 
the fact that the "higher law," by reference to which positive law is to 
be judged, must ultimately be invoked and interpreted by fallible 
human institutions, judicial or otherwise. Since humans can always be 
wrong in making these judgments, fiat (in the positivist's sense) will 
inevitably remain the last stop in any argument about what should be 
done from the legal point of view. 
In short, positivism emphasizes the fiat element oflaw, taking little 
or no account of the reasons behind fiat that might justify the state's 
normative claims; natural law emphasizes that the state's normative 
claims about law must be justified by reasons, but ignores the inevita-
40. See Philip Soper, Making Sense of Modern Jurisprudence: The Paradox of Positivism and 
the Challenge for Natural Law, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 67 (1988). 
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ble role of fiat in the process of discovering and applying those 
reasons. 
C. Illustrating the Dilemma: What Natural Law Is Not 
The above general remarks can be illustrated by considering recent 
developments within natural law legal theory. These developments 
represent arguments for natural law that do not, it seems to me, yield 
any recognizable difference in the way a legal system would operate -
at least not any difference that would reflect the central natural law 
idea that morality, not convention alone, is to have some role in deter-
mining a citizen's legal obligations. In the next section, I shall con-
sider just how that central idea could be implemented (and might 
make a difference). 
1. Natural Law as a Theory of Adjudication 
The dominant tendency among recent revivals of natural law alter-
natives to positivism is to suggest that natural law theory demon-
strates that judges must reach "very deep into political and moral 
theory"41 in deciding a case. This suggestion is intended to be anti-
positivist in character because, presumably, the positivist would limit 
judges to interpreting and applying accepted conventional rules, re-
gardless of the rules' moral merit. But depicting natural law as an 
alternative theory of adjudication threatens to trivialize the natural 
law insight for the reasons just discussed: if the only point of a natural 
law theory is to permit judges to take account of moral standards, as 
well as conventional legal ones, nothing will have been gained if, in the 
end, the judge's application of those moral standards becomes the au-
thoritative and binding legal decision. All that will have been done is 
to shift the controlling fiat from that of the legislature (or the prior 
judicial precedent in a common law case) to that of the judge in the 
instant case. 
One may have reasons for thinking that judges in general are better 
able to assess the moral merits of a case than are legislatures, or that 
judges in the present are better able to assess rules than judges in the 
past who created the purportedly binding precedent. But the argu-
ments from political theory required to defend those beliefs are not 
likely to persuade many. Consider, if nothing else, the familiar argu-
ments from political theory that explain why judges in a democracy 
should be subservient to legislative judgments. In short, this version of 
natural law is simply an undefended argument about whose fiat is bet-
41. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 877. 
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ter - the legislature's or the judge's. It is not an argument for the 
superiority of moral truth over conventional views, but merely an in-
tramural squabble about which branch's moral judgments shall be 
authoritative. 42 
It is easy to see why natural law legal theorists might be misled 
into thinking that the point of their theory is to develop a nonpositivist 
theory of adjudication. The claim that legal obligations, like moral 
ones, must reflect some objective reality (a "higher law") invites the 
claim that a citizen's complaint about the state's coercion of her must 
be measured by some true assessment of her moral and political rights, 
not just by what is conventionally accepted. So far, well and good. 
Such a theory is antipositivist in one sense: positivists have spent so 
much time insisting that one can determine legal validity without ref-
erence to morality that it is valuable to contest positivism's account of 
how judges actually do and should decide cases. But to stop here is to 
miss the main point of a positivist theory of law. The main point has 
always been that, in the end, it is human will and fiat that determines 
what law is. As long as the judge's decision becomes legally binding, 
the system remains positivist in the most significant sense, with the 
judge simply serving as the sovereign in place of the legislature. 
Some legal realists, of course, have always recognized this point, 
and have built elaborate theories largely around this simple insight; if 
the judge's say is final and legally authoritative, it is more realistic to 
accept that law is really whatever judges say, rather than what the 
"paper rules" say. Positivists, like Hart, resist this attempt to debunk 
legal standards, 43 but others seem sympathetic to the point, at least 
with respect to the authority of a legal system.44 Small wonder, then, 
that the natural law legal theorist who simply takes sides in this dis-
pute seems indistinguishable from the positivist or the realist. 
What would a natural law legal theorist have to do to avoid this 
collapse into a positivism of a different kind - one that promotes 
judges, rather than legislators, as sovereigns? The tempting answer is 
that the natural law theorist must refuse to let anyone's fiat - judge's 
or legislator's - determine a citizen's actual legal duty or justify the 
42. Oddly enough, the argument that legislative judgments should be seen as having no au-
thority (except in the theoretical sense, as examples of legislative advice about the best thing to 
do), is made by both positivists and natural law legal theorists. Compare JOSEPH RAz, THE 
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 28-31, 48-53 (1986) (making positivist argument) and Joseph Raz, 
Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 3, 14, 18 (1985) (same) with Heidi M. Hurd, 
Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 (1990) (taking natural law position). 
43. See HART, supra note 12, at 120-50. 
44. See RAz, MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 42, at 26; Raz, Authority and Justifica-
tion, supra note 42, at 5. 
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imposition of sanctions. I shall explore the implications of this sugges-
tion in the next section. For now it is enough to note that even Ronald 
Dworkin, the most influential of recent natural law theorists, has al-
most nothing to say about the binding force of a judge's decision. 
However erroneous the judge's decision, that decision presumably has 
the force of law, in both the moral and coercive senses, even though 
the decision's gravitational effect as a precedent may be severely lim-
ited. 45 Natural law theorists like Dworkin, in short, use theories of 
mistake only to get the correct stock of legal/moral standards, rather 
than to limit the force of human (judicial) fiat in any particular case. 
2. Natural Law as a Call for the Sovereignty of Individual 
Conscience 
If any theory of adjudication that permits a human decision to 
have the force of law is, in the end, a positivist legal theory, one possi-
ble explanation for what a natural law theory must be is this: a natu-
ral law legal theorist must admit that no decision has the force of law 
just because someone said so - judge or legislator. The point of the 
theory is to urge the citizen to recognize that fiat must always in the-
ory yield to the citizen's own assessment of the reasons for and against 
action. 
Of course, the dilemma one faces in taking this position is the one 
noted earlier: forced to retreat from a theory that simply displaces the 
point at which fiat becomes legally (and morally) effective, the natural 
law theorist seems to have nothing left to offer but a call for a kind of 
anarchy. There is no "law," in the conventional sense, but only judg-
ments about what is best to do, made by legislators, judges, and citi-
zens. Often, of course, citizens will have good reasons for deferring to 
the judgments of officials; but even then, they do so only in the exer-
cise of their own judgment. So these cases, too, do not involve ac-
knowledging the force oflaw for its own sake. The only "law" is what 
the final judgment of history (or God) will prove in fact to have been 
the right thing to do. 
This is an unhappy position for a natural law theorist to take. For 
one thing, modem positivists, many of whom make exactly the same 
claim, will once again eagerly accept, rather than resist, such a posi-
tion. The point of a positivist theory of law is to preserve the sover-
eignty of individual conscience by clarifying the separation between 
the fact oflaw and its relevance to what one ought to do.46 The more 
45. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, at 108-13. 
46. See MACCORMICK, supra note 15, at 158-62; Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic Case/or A-
Moralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1985); see also supra notes 10, 14-16, 36, and 
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critical problem is that this position, bordering as it does on anarchy, 
underscores what is missing in natural law legal theory: recognition of 
the possibility that fiat (however wrong) may have moral force of ex-
actly the kind that legal systems claim. Without actually engaging in 
the moral theory that will test the extent to which fiat may trump 
reason (for good reasons of its own), the natural law theorist cannot 
know whether conventional, positivist tests for law will or will not 
yield, as a matter of correct political theory, "true" political and moral 
rights. 
D. Resolving the Dilemma: What Could Natural Law Be? 
1. The Parameters of a Natural Law Theory 
What, then, could a natural law theory expect to accomplish if 
explicitly accepted by a legal system? How could it avoid simply be-
coming another kind of positivism or a call for individual anarchy and 
the end of law? 
While I shall not attempt here to answer this question definitively, 
enough has been said to sketch some possibilities. First, a brief review 
of what seem to me the critical parameters: 
(a) A natural law legal theory must be a claim about the limits of 
the ability of convention or fiat to serve as the basis on which a state 
can justify the moral claims it makes about its legal directives. 
(b) To avoid simply being another version of positivism's sugges-
tion that convention is one thing and the morality of convention an-
other, the natural law theorist must be able to build into the actual 
operation of the legal system the very claim about the limits on conven-
tion that both the natural lawyer and the positivist qua political theo-
rist accept. 
(c) To build the limits on fiat into a theory of law requires more 
than just shifting around the point at which the moral assessment of 
legal standards is made. Legislatures, if they are acting in good faith, 
presumably think their legal standards are moral; judges would have 
similar confidence in their reassessments of the morality of a legal 
standard, and citizens would similarly trust their own efforts to "sec-
ond-guess" the morality of official directives. The limits on fiat must 
themselves be officially recognized exceptions to the claims legal sys-
tems make about their directives. 
(d) Presumably, the exceptions that a legal system must recognize 
to the force of fiat are those that a correct political theory about the 
accompanying text. See generally Philip Soper, Choosing a Legal Theory on Moral Grounds, 
Soc. PHIL. & POLY., Autumn 1986, at 31. 
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limits of the state's coercive power would justify. If a correct political 
theory shows that the anarchist is right - states cannot justify any of 
their coercive acts or moral claims - then all law should be recog-
nized as having no moral force qua law and no moral claims about 
legal norms are appropriate. But if political theory establishes state 
authority beyond what the anarchist will admit, then the claim that 
legal norms have moral force (even if the norm is wrong) is appropri-
ate to that extent; natural law becomes a way of pointing to the limits 
on the authority of the state's claims that any state should itself be able 
to accept. 
The attempt to implement a program that meets these conditions 
must confront two initial problems. (1) Exactly what are the claims a 
state makes about its legal norms? (2) How can a state, without con-
tradiction or paradox and without sliding into anarchy, limit those 
claims? 
2. The Claims of the State 
I began by suggesting that the point of a model of law might be not 
only to identify the legal standards of a society, but also to reflect the 
moral claims that the state makes for those standards. On this, both 
natural law theorists and modem positivists agree. But modem posi-
tivism is content with a model that simply notes that law makes moral 
claims; the positivist does not address whether those claims are 
justified. 
The positivist's aloofness on the question of justification might be 
appropriate if the state's claims were just ordinary moral claims. 
Thus, any person who consciously acts against the interests of another 
presumably, if he thinks about it, believes that what he does can be 
morally justified. His belief is one thing; whether he is right is an-
other. So, too, with the state. The state may believe that its laws are 
just and punish those who disobey; whether its belief is correct is a 
separate issue. 
But this analogy between the ordinary claim to justice that charac-
terizes any serious action and the state's claims fails in a way that is 
critical to legal theory: the state's claim to justice asserts not only that 
the content of its laws is just, but also, and characteristically, that even 
if the content is wrong, the state is nevertheless justified in acting on its 
assessment and, for example, punishing those who disobey. It is not 
clear that the ordinary citizen makes a comparable claim. If I believe 
myself justified in striking you in self-defense or in order, say, to pro-
tect a third, innocent party, I do not normally think that even if I am 
wrong, I was nevertheless justified in my action just because it was my 
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belief that I was right. 47 In contrast, many think the critical aspect of 
the state's claim is that certain actions are morally permitted, or re-
quired, just because the law (convention) so requires. That is why the 
positivist faces a paradox in developing a supposed theory of law that 
fails to confront the essential normative claim that legal systems actu-
ally make. 
What are the claims that a state makes about its legal conventions, 
just because of their conventional status? There are two main pos-
sibilities: (i) The state claims the right to punish when the conven-
tional laws are broken, regardless of whether the content of the laws is 
correct; (ii) The state claims that citizens have obligations to obey 
conventional laws, just because they are "the law." 
Of these two claims, the first seems to me undeniable as an empiri-
cal matter and the one claim that a legal system can least afford to give 
up consistent with other normative practices. It is obvious that the 
consequences visited upon people in the name of the law (the taking of 
property, liberty, and life) cannot be approved unless one thinks they 
are morally justified. Whether the state also claims that citizens are 
morally obligated to obey the law regardless of content is more prob-
lematic - both as an empirical matter and as a matter of normative 
consistency. I have suggested elsewhere that legal systems typically do 
make such claims,48 but the question is admittedly controversial. For 
one thing, though legal systems might be incrementally more effective 
if based on a widespread belief in and official claim of a duty to obey, 
positivists are probably correct to observe that legal systems could 
function well enough with coercion alone. If the coercion, then, is 
morally justified, the additional claim of a duty to obey could be 
dropped without normative inconsistency or practical incoherence.49 
Second, the empirical evidence for whether legal systems do make this 
claim is clouded by the fact that the state will, of course, always claim 
that citizens have a content-dependent duty which the state, believing 
that its laws are correct, will claim is triggered in any particular case. 
For these reasons, without meaning to prejudice the possible claim of a 
duty to obey, I shall limit the argument in the remainder of this article 
47. One may plead that one's action should be excused, even if it was not justified, if it was 
the best one could do under the circumstances. In this respect, there may be a greater parallel 
between the actions of ordinary individuals and the state than is often recognized; i.e., even the 
state may be claiming, not content-independence for its norms, but only the right to be wrong 
that is entailed in the recognition that individuals can only act on the basis of their best beliefs, 
and may thus commit no moral wrong, even if an act later turns out to have been immoral. 
48. See Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim to Authority, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209 
(1989). 
49. In deciding whether the law does or should claim a duty to obey, more needs to be said 
about the relative appeal (moral?, aesthetic?) of societies that do/do not make such claims. 
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to the minimal moral claim that every legal system must make: the 
claimed right to enforce laws, simply because those laws are believed 
(conventionally) to be just. 
It is not difficult to explain how a state could justify punishment 
regardless of the content of the laws. The state's claim combines two 
familiar ideas: (1) Somebody ("officials") must decide controversies 
within society; (2) As long as the authorized official has made the de-
cision in good faith, the resulting action is justified (no moral wrong is 
done), even if one later discovers the decision itself was wrong. 
The first claim, that someone must decide, seems to me the easy 
point to establish through classical political theory - far easier than 
the claim that the state has the authority to determine one's moral 
obligations. Almost all political theory begins with the recognition, 
most obvious in Hobbes, that the whole rationale for the state lies in 
the need to centralize the decisionmaking apparatus and control of 
force, as an alternative to the state of nature that would otherwise 
exist. This simple point cannot be refuted by protesting that the state 
has only a limited role to play, as per classical "nightwatchman" theo-
ries;50 the point will still remain that someone will have to decide even 
these disputes about the proper role of the state, where decided means 
to take action based on one's own best judgment about the appropriate 
role of the state. The decision to leave some choices to the private 
arena, if it becomes controversial enough to require an institutional 
resolution, is itself, in short, a state decision. 
That somebody must decide is, then, the quick defense of fiat -
fiat is inevitable. Particular legal systems will fix the decision point at 
which some official's judgment becomes final differently. Some will 
place fiat with the legislature, some with the courts; and some may 
even allow citizens to make the decision, with officials playing only an 
advisory role (in which case, presumably, no law, and hence no pun-
ishment, prevents the citizen's acting on his or her own lights). But 
however this decision is made, once it is made, the legal system, in 
acting on the decision, is simply exercising the basic right to decide 
that must be implicit in any theory about the state that rejects 
anarchism. 
The second claim - that the state has the right to punish just 
because it is the law - also seems to me a straightforward idea. In-
deed, it is almost a definition of the right to decide, which, if it means 
anything, must mean more than just the right to give advice. That this 
50. See, e.g .• JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 374-94 (Peter Laslett ed., 
1985) (1698); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 25-27 (1974). 
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claim is dependent only on the state's acting in its own best moral 
judgment, and is not defeated because the law turns out to be wrong, is 
a familiar feature of legal systems. Think of how often process (good 
faith attempts to get at the truth) trumps substance in any legal sys-
tem. Innocent persons may be imprisoned for years, only to discover 
that a factual error was made and no crime committed. For the most 
part, such persons seldom have a claim for reparation as of right, 
rather than being dependent on legislative grace for redress. We jus-
tify, in short, mistakes in applying the law on the grounds that we did 
our best. How much easier, then, to justify laws correctly applied and 
believed at the time to be just, but later determined to be unjust? 
Here, too, the defense that we did our best at the time to act as we 
thought justice required seems easy to accept. 51 
The case for fiat justifying punishment is, in short, strong. It is 
reflected in a variety of familiar legal doctrines: without some end to 
the question of whether the law was really morally just, there could be 
no :finality to decisions, and no ex post facto defense for those who rely 
on legal conventions, accepted as just at the time, but later denounced 
as unjust and made illegal (or legal as the case may be). With such a 
large morally justifiable role for fiat, natural law theory faces the dan-
ger of proving to be a theory about nothing. It purports to contrast 
the moral claims based on convention with "true" legal and moral 
claims, but if the "truth" is that convention really does justify much 
of what the law does in the various ways just mentioned, then the 
positivist's model will prove correct, and, at the same time, the claims 
of legal systems will be justified. 
3. Limiting the State's Claims 
The problems just uncovered point the way to the most plausible 
effect of a conscious adoption of the natural law view. The difference 
that natural law would make, if any, must be found in the effect that 
the theory would have on certain concepts internal to law (rather than 
on theories about which particular institution should make the final 
determination) - concepts such as the :finality of legal decisions or the 
legitimacy of ex post facto legislation. This last observation suggests 
an obvious analogy to the Nuremberg principles: the idea that the 
51. So, too, many think that Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which held 
that the internment of Japanese citizens during World War II was consistent with constitutional 
guarantees, was wrongly decided. But few suggest that the decision and the resulting sanction, if 
reached in good faith, is somehow vitiated by the recognition of the mistake that was made. The 
recent decisior. Jverturning the judgment was on procedural grounds. See Korematsu v. United 
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating conviction because of prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
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justifications for fiat (including the right to punish) reach a limit when 
the content of the law is so unjust as to override the excuse "we did as 
we, in good faith, thought best." Transgression of these limits would 
then serve as a theoretical limit on the state's ability to justify its ac-
tions on the basis of convention alone. 
The cases where this theoretical limit is reached will be rare for 
two reasons: (1) it is only serious moral error (which no reasonable 
person could in good faith dispute) that would limit law's normative 
power - an unusual situation in any reasonably decent society; and 
(2) the decision that even this limit has been reached will itself have to 
be made by a potentially fallible, human institution (either a different 
tribunal, or a later tribunal, but in either case, still a fallible human 
institution). For both reasons, the conscious adoption of natural law 
would probably have no obvious effect except to serve as a symbolic 
reminder of the extremes to which even persons acting in good faith 
can sometimes be led. 
To reach a conclusion that in some ways is so familiar, and in 
others has so little practical implications for any decent society, may 
be disappointing. The conclusion is what one often hears: that truly 
unjust laws do not obligate and have no moral power either to justify 
punishment or to excuse those who act in reliance on the law. That 
the idea is worth keeping alive is borne out, not just by the horrors 
detailed at Nuremberg, but, more recently, by potential criminal pros-
ecutions in West Germany (and elsewhere) against those who, alleg-
edly, committed acts against humanity in the name of purportedly 
lawful conventions. Solace, if any, for such a mild conclusion should 
perhaps be sought in the fact that the persistence of such simple ideas 
may be a reflection of their truth, however disappointing it may be 
that the truth here is less complex than natural law theorists often like 
to think. 
CONCLUSION 
In one of his justly famous early articles, Lon Fuller called atten-
tion to the role that must be allowed for both reason and fiat in law.52 
Fuller's apparent object at the time he was writing was to restore the 
role of reason in adjudication during a time when fiat seemed to domi-
nate the approach to legal theory and to common law adjudication.53 
Today, the imbalance seems to have shifted in the opposite direc-
52. Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946). 
53. This is Summers' interpretation. See ROBERT s. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 63-70 
(1984). 
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tion. Too little respect is given to the role of fiat in law - not just the 
role that positivists have always emphasized in their quest for a model 
of legal validity, but now, too, in the role that fiat plays in justifying 
the moral claims of the state. 
The natural law dilemma results from starting at the opposite end 
from the positivist in constructing a model of law - focusing on the 
reasons for accepting rules rather than on the rules that have been 
accepted. But the dilemma leads to the same point reached in consid-
ering the paradox of positivism; natural lawyers must confront polit-
ical theory to determine the limits on the state's power to create 
obligations or justify punishment through (reasoned) fiat. Until they 
do so, they cannot rule out the possibility that social facts (in the posi-
tivist's sense) play the dominant role in establishing the connection 
between law and morality that has always been the natural law legal 
theorist's central concern. 
